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ABSTRACT 
We investigated utilizing serious games to train officers on Navy operational 
staffs, such as carrier strike groups (CSGs), destroyer squadrons (DESRONs), and 
amphibious squadrons (PHIBRONs). Such staffs are composed of officers from different 
warfare communities, such as aviation, submarines, and surface warfare. Most have not 
served on such a staff before and have limited familiarity with the inner workings and 
responsibilities of their command. We reviewed the current standards of training and 
serious games usage, and designed an experiment to determine whether serious games 
could provide a statistically significant improvement in training transfer for deployable 
staff officers compared to traditional methods of training. The experiment group 
was composed of West-Coast watchstanders. They played two different scenarios 
on two separate gaming applications for a total of four sessions. We compared 
performances between the experimental group and control group using a pre-test and a 
post-test given after the training. We also conducted another test one month later to 
see if a difference existed in long-term retention. The control group was enrolled in 
the joint maritime tactics course, using classroom lectures administered by 
Tactical Training Group, Atlantic. Small sample size merited nonparametric statistics 
usage, which increased the difficulty of obtaining significant results. Only one test 
produced a significant outcome, but the results feed into demand for future work. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. RELEVANCE 
U.S. Navy deployable staff officer billets are filled from a variety of communities 
like aviation, surface, subsurface, and even restricted line officers such as information 
warfare. This practice provides the flag officer or commodore with varying experiences 
and talents. Not all backgrounds offer a similar experience, even if they are from the same 
community. For instance, there are differences between officers stationed in forward 
deployed locations like Japan and those on the eastern seaboard, those with cruiser or 
destroyer (CRUDES) experience versus surface warfare officers (SWOs) who served on 
amphibious ships, or aviators flying expeditionary rotary aircraft compared with carrier air 
wing fixed wing fighters. It is impossible for an organization as large as the Navy to provide 
staff leadership with every unique skill and knowledge desired. There is not one ideal 
background, or one that is more successful than others with the exception of individual 
sustained superior performance. Each deployable staff officer should, like any job, have 
the expectations communicated and the tools to succeed.  
Watchstanders prepare for deployment using he optimized fleet response plan 
(OFRP) construct. Officers reporting to a deployable staff are highly qualified on the 
platform they came from, but less familiar with other communities and associated systems’ 
capabilities. During pre-deployment “work-ups” and throughout deployment they will 
have to do more than just interact with other platforms or staffs. The skills and knowledge 
of staff officers are only honed with training and experience in the job, and only a fraction 
of the previous years’ experience applies. For instance, a top-performing SWO with years 
of experience in engineering and propulsion systems on DDG Flight IIA destroyers may 
not have the ability to communicate with “Whiskey” or “Zulu” for tasking a P-8A Poseidon 
intending to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) during a strait 
transit.  
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B. CURRENT U.S. NAVY TRAINING  
The Navy must train a diverse set of communities to a requisite level of readiness. 
To train and educate so many different members by rate and rank, they must employ a host 
of distinctive methods. Traditionally, the Navy would “train like you fight” on the actual 
system in a live training environment. There are other training tools available to augment 
and sometime replace live training. 
1. Navy Training for Unrestricted Line 
There are a host of training programs and curriculums relying solely upon the live 
environment. For example, to execute shooting a missile from an aircraft for training and 
readiness, many things must happen. There needs to be one or more mission-capable 
aircraft provided by the maintenance team, ordnance ordered and received from a combat 
aircraft loading area (CALA), a scheduled and approved area on a range, an ordnance load 
team, the qualified aircrew, and evaluation SME to determine if it was a valid expenditure. 
If one piece failed for any reason, the event would lose its usefulness, and must be 
scheduled.  
Some emerging training options were helpful but limited, which meant that 
traditional training methods continued to be the standard. The Navy evolved its live 
training by including training ordnance like recoverable torpedoes and blank ammunition 
before embracing other technologies like virtual training in simulators. However, warship 
steaming and pilot flight time was still necessary to judge the crews ready for deployment. 
More days underway were also required than today since a legitimate alternative did not 
exist.  
Today, technology improved and other training methods became possible. Training 
curriculums contain a mix of simulators, or ”sims,” and live training, with live still the 
preferred option when available. Previously, sims could only practice emergency 
procedures and novice cockpit procedures. Sims are becoming a more widely accepted and 
used resource since they consistently execute tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), 
save time, money, and allows many repetitions safely while freeing up actual systems for 
operational use. Indeed, sims have expanded capabilities due to investments in fidelity 
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upgrades over the last decade. Sims now there are more complex arrangements which link 
disparate platforms and locations together, which is a training concept called “LVC,” or 
live, virtual, constructive.  
Unrestricted line communities train on more than just sims and live training. Navy 
members are familiar with and use initial classroom training, computer-based training 
(CBT), part-task trainers (PTT), to name a few. CBTs are mostly known as annual, passive 
training lessons accessible anywhere and anytime. PTTs train the user on a specific process 
or skillset. The 2018 keynote speaker of the Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation and 
Education Conference in Orlando, ADM Grady said, “We must apply modern training 
delivery models, understanding that everything isn’t best learned in a brick-and-mortar 
schoolhouse” (Lee, 2018). Though the Navy still uses classrooms to gather students, they 
employ lessons on tablets or practice on synthetic trainers like the multipurpose 
reconfigurable training system (MRTS).  
2. Staff Training 
Staff officers carry a heavy burden of required experience and a skillset including 
communication, decision-making, and comprehension of doctrine and leadership guidance. 
Navy deployable staffs use only a few training aids and some classroom training. First-
time watchstanders usually attend classroom education for exposure to necessary staff 
officer skills. Through the OFRP, a staff will complete fleet synthetic training (FST). FST 
provides the staff an opportunity to practice as though deployed and executing a realistic 
scenario. Finally, the staff gets underway for a few weeks to train with the other staffs who 
they will deploy with later.  
C. CAN A SERIOUS GAME HELP? 
Deployable staffs need a variety of training options; two methods like FST and 
weeks-long live training may not meet all the individual needs. The OFRP outlines the 
training curriculum along with other requirements to be certified for deployment. Though 
extensive resources and planning go into executing a curriculum, there is always room for 
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an outside perspective to analyze if their training can in any way be further optimized. One 
such optimization tool for training could be a serious game (SG). 
Serious games have been used for decades to teach in different capacities than 
traditional teacher-student classroom methods. One of the first was Oregon Trail, an 
education game widely used in the 1980s. Increased computational power enabled a first-
person shooter named America’s Army (U.S. Army, 2002). This SG proved educational 
and motivational across a broader audience. Over the last decade, the SG niche has grown 
beyond academic curiosity with specific designs to accommodate adaptive learning 
techniques. The desire to integrate these possibilities has swelled alongside an ever-
increasing appetite for electronic home entertainment systems and games. 
Serious games are strong motivational tools compared to traditional learning 
means. “Fun” is a powerful force that leads to higher interest and curiosity levels (Iten & 
Petko, 2014). A group of players completing an SG makes them individually feel a sense 
of accomplishment, and perhaps desire continuing to learn without being prompted. The 
experience is unique even if everyone starts the SG at the same time. Conversely, in a 
classroom setting, if all students take a test and see they all received the same score then it 
minimizes the overall significance.  
The time had arrived where properly designed games could inject more than just a 
respite from traditional learning methods. Just like the military’s training community does 
not want to replace live training completely with virtual training, the gaming community 
is merely attempting to augment traditional learning with digital opportunities. The latest 
technology-savvy generation entering the military should have the most applicable learning 
techniques and training systems available to take advantage of their core skillsets. 
D. SCOPE OF EFFORT  
This thesis will investigate if serious games can provide better or more cost-
effective training options for deployable staff officers than the training methods the Navy 
currently employs. The goal is to increase the knowledge for the following research 
questions.  
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1. What is the current standard, and are existing training methods meeting 
the standard?  
2. What are the factors that a serious game should possess to effectively train 
Navy staffs?  
3. Can serious games either replace some training that is currently being 
done to standard but is cost-ineffective, or fill a gap previously identified? 
4. Do the serious games used provide a statistically significant difference in 
training transfer for deployable staff officers compared to traditional 
methods of training? 
The first three research questions will be discussed in Chapter II. The last question 
uses the hypothesis claiming there was no difference in training between classroom 
instruction and playing serious games. Data is analyzed with survey data and a pretest/post-
test/post-test experiment format. During the experiment, participants from Navy staffs 
played two different serious games over two days with two different scenarios. A control 
group was given classroom instruction. A statistical comparison of the experimental and 
control group using mixed-design ANOVA was used. 
1. Omitted Areas of Study 
An important point to emphasize is the experiment does not double as a training 
effectiveness evaluation (TEE). A TEE is a much more involved process, and considered 
a future work possibility. 
Construction of a purposefully designed serious game is also outside the scope of 
this thesis. The time and resources required to properly design a serious game that meets a 
currently uncommunicated requirement is far greater of an undertaking and beyond this 
paper. Though this is a potentially important undertaking, it will be confined to the future 
work section. 
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2. Thesis Organization 
Chapter II provides a background and foundation for understanding the thesis 
experiment. It provides detail about how a deployable staff trains for deployment, discusses 
the specifics of a serious game, and contains a literature review regarding pertinent topics. 
Chapter III covers the approach which includes the hypothesis, scenarios, methods for 
collecting data, and information on the participants. Chapter IV covers data compiled as 
well as the analysis and interpretation of this data. Chapter V finishes with a discussion of 
the experiment, some recommendations, and future work opportunities.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. HOW A DEPLOYABLE STAFF GETS READY TO DEPLOY 
Staff leadership has a different role than that of a squadron or ship commanding 
officer. The staff admiral or commodore is charged with planning documents, battle 
rhythm, training, and providing guidance to those operational units under their tactical 
control (TACON). The staff’s guidance from higher leadership comes from instructions 
(Department of the Navy, 2013; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018; Department of the Navy, 2010) 
and the OFRP (U.S. Fleet Forces Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet Command, 2012; U.S. Fleet 
Forces Command, II Marine Expeditionary Forces, 2016), also known as the deployment 
cycle, details the process. The Navy deployment cycle is broken down into four phases. 
Scoping the OFRP to staffs is the next section, and will include a discussion on the main 
training and readiness aspects needed to be certified ready to deploy.  
1. Navy Deployment Cycle  
The Department of Defense (DoD) spends billions of dollars annually to train and 
increase readiness so units are prepared to deploy. Every task that the military trains to is 
tracible to a larger national defense strategy (DoD, 2018; President of the United States, 
2017). The country’s high-level strategy documents produce requirements that the military 
must fulfill, and these requirements create mission essential tasks (MET) for the units and 
individuals to meet. When each Navy unit has completed the assigned METs and an 
assessment unit concurs, a certification for deployment will be awarded. The goal of the 
staff is to achieve a certification that they are ready to deploy. The OFRP is the framework 
spelling out what is needed to achieve the certification. It breaks down into four distinct 
phases: maintenance, basic, integrated, and sustainment. A unit’s training curriculum 
differs depending upon how close it is to deploying. The OFRP commences upon 
completion of the sustainment phase (when the unit is no longer either deployed or serving 
as a potential surge force). 
The maintenance phase begins the entire deployment cycle. This is when units 
receive the bulk of major maintenance and upgrades. This is the ideal time to transition the 
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support staff in order to send the new members to required schools. In this phase, units are 
not considered deployment-ready, and the Navy devotes minimal effort toward attaining 
high readiness levels at this juncture since most will not count toward the unit’s readiness 
score when certification is desired. Some training has a periodicity, meaning that after a 
few months it no longer factors into determining if the unit is ready to deploy. Most training 
during this phase is devoted to individual training  
The next phase is the basic phase. The goal of the basic phase is completion of unit-
level training (ULT). Members of the unit should complete as many individual 
requirements and internal unit needs as possible. Individual training expands to include 
team drills and practice, and exposure to who else is making the same deployment. Less 
complicated FST events are conducted here. Funding increases some in this phase to 
improve readiness but remains overall low since the actual deployment is still likely many 
months away. Readiness acts as a binary checklist of items achieved across the OFRP 
making it easy for leadership to measure completed and remaining tasks.  
The integrated phase is the third and final pre-deployment phase. The training 
dimensions expand to the most rigorous and complex scenarios for the unit to include 
associated units deploying together. Integrated training, knowledge, and skills should 
reflect the maximized budgeting for readiness. By its completion, the organization should 
have completed in-port and at-sea training exercises like FST and composite training unit 
exercise (COMPTUEX). Figure 1 shows all the events for a strike group across the OFRP. 
FST-J, or the most complex “joint” version, is the final pre-deployment requirement after 
underway periods. This combines numerous units from multiple services practicing 
mission sets that are otherwise nearly impossible to coordinate considering schedules and 
costs. 
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Figure 1. Generic carrier strike group OFRP. Source: U.S. Fleet 
Forces Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet Command (2012). 
The last phase is the sustainment phase. Sustainment can encompass a period prior 
to and the period between deployments. Sustainment funding is sufficient to maintain 
readiness till the next potential deployment. Here, a strike group staff attempts to maintain 
readiness as best as possible with the tools available like FST or even sending 
watchstanders to other staffs to sharpen skillsets. This is the glue to enable getting two 
deployments from the same training cycle, but any major personnel transfers can negatively 
impact the second deployment.  
2. Staff Deployment Cycle  
The OFRP, or work-up cycle, is an incredibly busy time for a deployable staff. The 
training aspects of the work-up cycle are not the only important items requiring attention. 
Like any deployable unit, there are tasks received from superiors and delegated to 
subordinates. Finding time to fit in all the levels of requirements and maintain a high 
standard of skill proficiency is similarly arduous. Knowledge and skill acquisition are 
perishable, especially for the officers serving for the first time on a staff. Staffs require a 
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method to train officers which does not interfere with their other duties during the work-
up cycles.  
A staff watch officer serving for the first time normally attends a two-week course 
named Joint Maritime Tactics Course (JMTC) at tactical training group, Atlantic (TTGL) 
or Pacific (TTGP). This course exposes the new staff officer to primary warfare areas, the 
course of action (COA) process, battle rhythm for daily and weekly operations, 
understanding the interactions required between warfare commanders, and hands-on 
practice with a FST event. The staff officer may take other courses offered if more specific 
education is needed on the staff, the longest class taking over a month.  
Another major training function offered throughout the OFRP for staff officers is 
FST. FSTs are typically dedicated staff officer training events that tie in virtual players and 
operators linked-in to contribute, as available and requested. FST can increase or decrease 
the complexity of the event based on the participants needs or proficiency, and can last 
from a day to a week. These adaptive traits mean FST can be employed in most any phase 
of the OFRP. FST is a cornerstone of the staff officer training curriculum since the only 
alternative is to embark the carrier and get underway for live training. Live training is saved 
for the integrated phase after conducting simulated “reps and sets” to improve watchstander 
competence and experience.  
Dedicated courses for staff officers, FST and live underway training are the primary 
training options for watchstanders. This training is in addition to the all-Navy training 
requirements like general military training, annual CBTs, or physical fitness. The three 
primary options do not cover all training opportunities afforded to operators. There are no 
PTTs or specialized CBTs. This points to a gap to better prepare or sustain watchstander 
skillsets when preparing for deployment.  
B. THE SCIENCE OF LEARNING AND ITS IMPACT ON GAMING 
As technology has matured, there have been an increasing number of studies to 
better understand several pertinent questions, like whether an SG has tangible benefits. 
What field has the most effective integration tools? How does an SG compare to a 
traditional teacher-student pedagogical environment? To best understand how an SG 
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transfer of training works, there are additional foundational studies worth noting. This 
section provides three parts: first, an overview of some relevant theories and best practices; 
next, is about SG performance assessment experiments and outcomes; finally, peer-
reviewed SG studies that speak specifically to transfer of training. 
A foundational piece for understanding the benefits of serious games is in the 
science of learning. One of the most widely accepted studies is Bloom’s taxonomy (1956). 
Though cited for traditional classroom education, this makes sense as a starting point to 
field questions about SG learning qualities. This taxonomy was a baseline for creating 
surveys and test questions for participants in the experiment playing serious games and 
control group receiving classroom training. This established method used a hierarchical 
model for classification and learning objectives based on complexity and specificity. The 
six stages in order from lowest to highest are knowledge, comprehension, application, 
analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. Even though there are legitimate arguments since its 
acceptance from the field of education, it maintains its place as a relevant organizational 
tool from which to judge the process of learning.  
Naturalistic decision making (NDM) is germane to learning sciences discussion 
since the military values experience when making decisions, especially since a military 
mistake can cost lives, precious equipment, or time. NDM was conceived in the 1980s, and 
is a framework to study how people come to their specific conclusions while inserted into 
complex, real-world circumstances. This can be a challenging method to glean significant 
outcomes from since there are potentially numerous variables dynamically changing during 
the test. From NDM came the recognition-primed decision (RPD) model, whose purpose 
was to try to explain how highly experienced people can quickly determine what 
information is critical to decision making while disregarding other seemingly pertinent 
data. NDM generally bins people’s skill in a task from novice to mastery, based on speed 
of intuition. RPD was considered a factor for the experiment’s players and how quickly 
they could properly employ TTPs.  
The latest framework for instructional design to achieve consensus acceptance 
came from Dr. M. David Merrill (2002). His name for the process is first principles of 
instruction. Its intent established a method that withstands different fields of study and their 
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associated learning needs. The central theory is that students achieve the best results in 
problem-centered issues. The first principles of instruction theory was considered as a 
refined Bloom’s taxonomy for measuring volunteers scoring and retention. This concept is 
broken down into five principles. The first principle states any task promotes learning the 
best when solving real-world problems. Activation helps students learn more by recalling 
past experience to learn new skills, which is similar to scaffolding. Demonstration of new 
knowledge is another way that promotes learning by being shown vice just being told. 
Performing real-world tasks is also superior for learning instead of simple information 
passing from teacher to student. Finally, integrating the new knowledge into the learner’s 
domain helps demonstrate understanding of the new learning topic.  
Game-related learning assessment is wrought with questions still. Though there 
have been many studies, little is known about what serious game elements can impact 
outcomes for student learning (Van Staalduinen & De Freitas, 2011). There needs to be a 
balance between open-ended games where the student may not do what the instructional 
designers intended versus having to strict of a path that reduces player motivation. Recent 
research and experimentation continue to provide in-game assessment tools for designers, 
though they are still maturing (Dede, 2012). Researchers are conducting experiments with 
large sample sizes over many years with an emphasis on capturing valid methodology and 
datasets to better understand assessment (Mayer et al., 2014).  
Just as assessment struggles to provide a definitive solution, showing a transfer of 
training is even more difficult:  
As such it is an important concept in determining training value. However, 
it can be difficult to determine what exactly is learned with respect to the 
(real) task or domain for which the training is intended. Transfer studies are 
complex and sometimes even impossible because the real-world situations 
do not permit the objective measurement of performance of former learners. 
And even when these real world measures can be collected, it remains 
questionable to what respect the training has contributed to that 
performance level, and to what respect performance and performance 
differences can be attributed to other factors. However, it is possible to get 
a reasonable insight in the Transfer of Gaming, or training value of games, 
by means of smart experimental designs. (Korteling, Helsdingen, Sluimer, 
van Emmerik, & Kappé, 2011, p. 20) 
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Some studies have valid proof in a limited synthetic environment such as playing a 
modified version of sim city (Loh, Sheng, & Ifenthaler, 2015 p. 345). Others have proven 
that mobile technology displayed similar effectiveness as traditional learning techniques 
(Hwang & Chang, 2011). There are numerous experiments showcasing limited information 
C. SERIOUS GAMES 
Serious games have been a proven learning tool for decades (Rawitsch, 1971). Just 
like other niche technologies, the public and end-user do not necessarily understand its 
description, the capabilities, limitations, or even the proper applications. LVC dealt with 
similar issues of fragmented definitions in recent years. Just as LVC meant different 
training possibilities to different stakeholders depending on service and community, 
serious games represent conflicting definitions or capabilities which exacerbate the 
challenge to intelligently inform prospective military customers of their value. Serious 
games need not become the next buzz word that offers a transformation in the science of 
learning over traditional methods employed today. The following section defines types of 
games, when it’s appropriate to use them, characterizing intended goals, establishing how 
to adapt and personalize the SG, and defining player experience.  
1. Serious Games Defined 
A serious game is defined as a digital game not with the primary purpose of pure 
entertainment, but with the intention of serious use as in training or education (Loh et al., 
2015 p. 6). This captures that there will be players using a digital interface to generate or 
improve comprehension of a topic.  
A common error is to assume an SG is the same as gamification. Gamification 
leverages game mechanics to motivate the users toward certain behaviors or practices; 
adding game elements to non-game topics. An example is a teacher giving stickers for 
participating in an elementary school classroom. Serious games are designed from 
inception to meet specific goals to increase performance or knowledge for the user. 
Characterizing the goals during the design phase of the SG is paramount. There is 
a direct link between SG motivation and the goals incorporated. Goals related to the design 
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of serious games break down into six competence domains (Wiemeyer & Hardy, 2013). 
This thesis will focus on cognitive and perceptual competences. Subsections of cognitive 
and perceptual competences include planning, problem-solving, and strategic thinking.  
Adaption and personalization help define SG with the expressed intention of being 
attractive and effective in engaging the player. Many options are available to make an SG 
attractive, such as having the ability to produce a unique avatar. This is also referred to as 
adaptability. Another important trait is adaptivity, which is monitoring the player to keep 
them on task via in-game assessments.  
The gaming experience sums up the previous discussion but from the output side 
of the equation. Flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1991) is the balance between the player’s skill 
level and task difficulty. If the experience bores the player, or is too difficult, then the game 
has a poor flow. Flow must adjust for player experience, knowledge retention, and expected 
skill attainment. Flow need not retain a simplified one to one ratio, but the SG must 
incorporate enticements to bring the player toward the end-goal. An important byproduct 
of flow is the player’s emotional state from gameplay (Novak & Johnson, 2012). Just as 
the designers should attempt to keep players’ flow balanced, emotions must be a 
consideration, as depicted in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Flow and journey. Source: Marczewski (2012). 
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2. Divergence of Serious Games Design from Entertainment Games  
Digital games for entertainment have been made for decades, resulting in an 
industry standard for rules, mechanics and gameplay design. SG designs are different than 
regular entertainment games, just like their intention and purpose are different. Serious 
games are most successful when created from scratch to engage the trainee in the desired 
ways. If designers transform an already built game into something outside the original 
design and intent, it tends to be more work without the desired effects. In comparison to 
entertainment games design process, an SG must account for data collection, assessment, 
and the user experience.  
Players in entertainment and serious games need properly communicated rules to 
understand to build trust and operate in the anticipated design of the game. Rules provide 
virtual constraints and limitations so players can work to win within the boundaries. One 
example is the physics-modeled speed of a bullet versus the speed of an agent. They also 
promise greater satisfaction from the player perspective upon finishing the game (Tekinbaş 
& Zimmerman, 2004). When a player wins within the confines of the game and its rules, 
they feel a sense of accomplishment; serious games can add learning the designed material 
on top the entertainment value. 
Mechanics and aesthetics are key aspects of any digital game, including serious 
games. These give a game its unique style and feel. There are many command and control 
(C2) serious games, including Command, Modern Air/Naval Operations. By making the 
player feel like they are in charge with many options to accomplish a challenging mission 
showcases a quality design. Graphics in serious games may emphasize an essential learning 
point by increasing the periodicity of specific markers on a virtual path the student needs 
to pick up, and reduce the number of markers later after more practice. 
The user’s experience (UX) refers to how seamless or fitting a game is to 
accomplish the required goals (Lazzaro, 2004). A SG wraps itself in many scientific fields 
to be successful. Figure 3 displays how the fields of science impact an SG. Programmers 
are crucial, but are not the only profession necessary. The UX cannot be created without 
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key contributions from other unique fields like psychologists, instructional designers, and 
specialists in the gaming field. They all contribute to building an enduring, successful SG. 
 
Figure 3. Integrative models of player experience. Source: Dörner, 
Göbel, Effelsberg, and Wiemeyer (2016). 
Entertainment and serious game data collection are accomplished several different 
ways, and it is up to the design teams to determine how they are going to proceed. Some 
of the following methods may also be employed by games for entertainment, but are meant 
for serious games. To obtain the desired data, an SG design must identify what behaviors 
and performance(s) will reveal a change in the subjects’ knowledge and skills. The right 
tasks or situations must be built to produce those behaviors. Designers refer to data 
collected from data logs within the game as in-situ data collection. External collection 
methods are known as ex-situ data collection. Ex-situ refers to the SG player’s teacher or 
administrator injecting questions during or after gameplay. This was the typical method to 
collect data, but is more susceptible to bias. In-situ collection is preferred, but costlier and 
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more time consuming to integrate with the SG programming. Without data collection, there 
is no way to know if any research will produce a statistically significant result.  
The primary in-situ collection methods are via telemetry, evidence-centered design 
(ECD), and stealth assessment. Telemetry obtains and utilizes measurement data. Game 
telemetry is the data associated with specific game events, the state of a game, or other 
parameters of interest (Dörner et al., 2016). The term implies the capture and logging of 
game events that occur. ECD (Mislevy, Geneva, Riconscente, Rutstein, & Ziker, 2017, 
pp. 19–24) is an entire framework that captures and analyzes behavior log data by 
incorporating cognitive science, statistical modeling, and the latest SG design technologies. 
It works in three stages, the first is domain analysis, then domain modeling, and last is 
conceptual assessment framework (CAF). Finally, stealth assessment suggests an invisible, 
assessment tool that interlaces directly into the gaming environment. It captures real-time 
data, and has provisions for adapting learning based on that data. All of these in-situ 
methods still require an experienced person to sift through all the game data to find the 
meaningful results. The output can be used to improve the user experience, the design, 
refine teaching goals, and many other uses.  
3. The Player’s Perspective of the Design Process 
The player’s perspective includes discussion on player experience (PE) and also 
different player types. PE is different from UX. PE relates to the behavioral, social, and 
psychological level of the individual. The expectation is for the test subject to have an 
experience, or interaction with the SG, not just be a passive bystander. PE normally divides 
into three specific facets when playing: challenge, tension, and immersion. Challenge is 
about whether the game engages the player to try their best. Tension deals with the players 
ability to finish the current game objective. Immersion is a mix of enhancing realism and 
consequential interactions in the gaming environment. Designers of serious games must 
accommodate PE through narrative paradox, PE measurement, and impacts of multi-PE. 
A story or novel attempting to reconcile with a game is called narrative paradox. 
Stories are static while games like chess rarely ever repeat in the exact same steps. 
Interactive storytelling is an attempt to provide the player freedom while still pursuing 
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goals. Narrative paradox has three dimensions—simulation, ludology, and narratology. 
Simulation is the game type or world. Narratives help relate player’s freedom versus the 
designer’s intention. Ludology is the study of gaming related to player action and designed 
events. Narratology is the study of structure, function of themes, and associated symbols. 
High simulation is an avatar world. High ludology example is Tetris while high narratology 
is a movie. If the balance is off, both the PE and designer suffer and the SG will not be 
used. 
PE measurement involves experimental techniques involving behavioral, 
physiological, and subjective methods (Dörner et al., 2016). Behavior methods can be 
assessed through game logs and reaction times. Physiological models comprise items like 
heart rate and muscle activity with supplemental technology. Subjective models include 
questionnaires and interviews meant to assess the player’s perception after using the SG. 
Questionnaires obtain information on topics from player curiosity to spatial presence to 
overall game-experience. Some PE measurement can be done with game metrics, persona 
modeling, or eye tracking. Measurement, like data collection, is crucial to obtaining usable 
information to answer research.  
Intelligent design helps associate different types of players to their actions. This 
taxonomy (Bartle, 1996) is considered applicable to both single player games and 
multiplayer, including offline and online games. The four types are killers, achievers, 
socializers, and explorers. Killers prefer competitive games, pitting their skills against 
others. Achievers enjoy completing the entire game and any bonus material. Socializers, 
as the name implies, make it their primary objective to gather online friends and relish in a 
wide social network. Finally, explorers seek out any hidden sections or places in a game 
with a map. They move at their own pace, and fair worse in timed sections of games. 
Without knowing and constraining the audience, the SG will lose impact and it learning 
content will not meet the objectives. 
Multiplayer serious games present additional design challenges to an already 
complicated single player SG. Multiplayer SG breaks down into three basic category types: 
competitive, cooperative, and collaborative. Competitive play means everyone fights for 
themselves only for the entire session. Cooperative play is a team concept for the session 
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while collaborative play intertwines the players individual needs with temporary team-
oriented goals. When mixing different learning preferences, personalities and types, the 
designer is attempting to bridge many combinations that could quickly nullify any possible 
positive outcome. The designers should precisely detail the interrelationships and 
interdependencies or the goals will unlikely be met.  
D. PREVIOUS SERIOUS GAMES RESEARCH FOR THE U.S. NAVY 
The Navy has explored the use of serious games just a few years ago. A Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) wargaming team of students in support of NWDC assessed 
operational level of war (OLW) though an analysis of serious games available in 2011 
According to Jeffrey Appleget (email to author, June 8, 2018), they evaluated if any 
training tools across the DoD perform the requirements necessary to increase proficiency 
of mid-grade deployable staff officers. They reviewed seven serious games; some were 
commercial, and others were produced for government use. Three related issues to this 
thesis were the valuation system used, the scoring process and metrics, and measures of 
effectiveness (MOE). 
The first input for stakeholders was to have a system to measure valuation. 
Leadership dictated a need which set a precedent indicating there was a training gap in the 
staff officer curriculum. After soliciting feedback from staff officers, looking at METs, and 
comparing with similar Army and USMC training systems, the OLW team was unable to 
achieve consensus regarding a set of training metrics common to all maritime staff officers. 
They decided to use NWC’s maritime staff operators’ course (MSOC), where the content 
attempts to capture the mindset of the mid-grade officers’ for OLW.  
Once they achieved consensus, the metrics compared the serious games against 
each other. The six categories for evaluation were doctrine, operational planning, decision 
making, feedback, utilization and flexibility. Each category breaks down further to trace 
each subcategory to a referenced publication or instruction, assuring unbiased criteria. 
Some of the subcategories were ambiguous, putting the onus on the player to fully 
comprehend and grade it properly.  
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MOE were the output of assembling the survey feedback, and displaying 
descriptive statistics and figures. Figure 4 is an example of a descriptive output in graphical 
form. 
 
Figure 4. Example of radar graph. Source: McDowell (2016). 
This radar graph provides a comparison of the SG based on the metrics outlined. 
This is just one method to display data collected, but shows average scores across the entire 
Likert survey employed. The reader can quickly interpret overall strengths and weaknesses 
of each game. Adding a weight to each subcategory can prioritize certain items that are of 
greater value to the staff officer. 
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E. USE OF SERIOUS GAMES FOR DEPLOYABLE STAFF TRAINING 
A serious game provides the user a productive, educational interaction that should 
also be entertaining and motivating. As technology evolves with the science of learning, 
the U.S. military has shown greater interest in serious games. An SG created from scratch 
maximizes its benefits. However, it is common practice to leverage current technologies in 
order to save time and money from having to enter to procurement process from the 
beginning. This experiment attempts to find the closest products answering similar needs 
with the ability to tweak the coding to meet the training needs.  
The Navy staff officer has a burdensome list of daily, weekly, and OFRP 
requirements to accomplish. Fitting in yet another requirement is not the goal of this thesis. 
However, it is reasonable to believe that augmenting some of the time devoted to reviewing 
instructions and publications they are responsible for could be of equal benefit or even a 
better use of time. The two serious games used in the thesis are jCORE and LITMUS 
Warfighter plug-in. They both served the Navy in different capacities as an SG or as an 
analysis tool.  
LITMUS and jCORE possess capabilities unique to the Navy and a strike group 
staff. Both games previously operated more at the tactical level, but adjustments trended 
the focal point toward the operational level of war (OLW). There was greater emphasis 
placed on exercising knowledge of doctrine, decision making, and pressing to better 
appreciate the nuances of interaction between composite warfare commander staffs. Both 
serous games still generally play at the tactical level, meaning the player chooses how to 
employ individual units or aircraft with the intent to think as a staff officer would think. 
Some planning aspects are incorporated, but it is not meant to be a dedicated planning tool. 
There are other tools already developed for that like Athena.  
Staff officers have many new skills and knowledge requirements and less time to 
learn them versus earlier in their career when learning to drive ships or submarines, or fly 
aircraft. Learning how to perform up to standard in the new billet requires having the 
training tools, information sources, and time to absorb and practice those skills. Most staffs, 
like ships or squadrons, build in time to train and review materials to improve or maintain 
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performance. Leaders naturally want their team to operate at as proficiently as possible. 
Since there is not dedicated part task trainer for staff officers, the newest watchstanders are 
beholden to FST opportunities or underway time to practice their skills. This experiment 
attempts to determine the value of an SG, augmenting the training curriculum similar to an 
operator using a PTT or sim.  
An academic point of contention related to training and readiness is proficiency. 
Proficiency is generally accepted as an advancement in knowledge or skill. This implies 
more than just an exposure to a topic, or practicing a complicated process nine months ago. 
Measuring proficiency is naturally even more challenging since there is not specific 
definition, process to follow, or standardization for how often to practice. An SG can be a 
tool that offers consistent availability and potentially a tailored training regimen. Progress 
in an SG can be measured (Scheldrup, 2018), as was the case using jCORE.  
Given the previously discussed ability of serious games to address specific training 
needs, we decided to investigate whether serious games could have an effect upon the 
training. The goal of our experiment was to determine whether a serious game can improve 
staff members’ performance on tests and get feedback on what factors of the serious games 
were required to improve performance. 
jCORE is a browser-based gaming tool built for PMR-51 by the game design 
company Pipeworks. An earlier component of jCORE was named Strike Group Defender 
(McDowell, 2016). This SG won top prize at I/ITSEC in 2014. jCORE operates as a single 
or multiplayer game from red or blue force perspective. Embedded are tutorials increasing 
in difficulty and complexity with performance metrics including scoring by how well the 
player properly defends their assets from enemy missiles. Recent upgrades challenge the 
player to work through multi-axis problems with land, sea, and air assets available, and 
employing offensive and defensive measures. jCORE used unity game engine as the player 
interface. In total, it took about 1.5 GB of memory on the laptops. 
The other SG is based on the LITMUS simulation, developed by Naval Warfare 
Development Center (NWDC) Dahlgren. LITMUS Warfighter plug-in leverages the 
analytic simulation to offer a browser-based multi-player SG. There is a tutorial to install 
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and learn the basics of the SG so a player can minimize time learning how to play and focus 
learning or reviewing. Though still in a beta phase, LITMUS Warfighter plug-in offers red 
versus blue forces anywhere in the world to practice surface and air TTP, theatre geometry, 
and decision-making. LITMUS used Unity game engine as the player interface. LITMUS 
took up about 1.5 GB of memory on the laptops as well. 
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III. APPROACH 
A. HYPOTHESIS 
Given the goal of determining whether SGs improved subjects’ knowledge, we 
formulated the following hypothesis: 
HO: There is no difference in pretest and post-test one from the experimental group 
HA: There is a statistically significant increase in score from pretest to post-test one 
regarding the experimental group. 
We later evaluated similar hypotheses by comparing the experiment subjects’ 
scores on the pretest to those on post-test two, and those on post-test one to those on post-
test two. The same format was used on the control group test scores. Finally, we compared 
the test scores between the two groups. 
B. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT 
1. Setup 
The main pieces of the experiment were the hardware, specially designed scenarios 
within jCORE and LITMUS, the phases of execution, and data collection including surveys 
and tests. This thesis consists of three major phases. Phase I was a pilot study enlisting the 
Navy staff SMEs. Phase II was composed of participants making up the experimental group 
whose training consisted of playing the two serious games. Phase III was the control group, 
who were trained in the traditional manner. We conducted all phases in accordance with a 
protocol approved by the NPS institutional review board (IRB). 
The hardware used for the experiment was eight laptops, a WIFI router (Phase I), 
two switches (phase II), and associated cables. Four laptops contained jCORE and four had 
LITMUS uploaded. The jCORE laptops were a mix of Alienware and Omni brands with 
sufficient computational power containing Core i5 processors or better. The jCORE laptops 
were connected together via Netgear switch and Cat V cables. This only required setting 
one laptop as the server and setting proper IP addresses on the others. The four computers 
with LITMUS were Dell laptops from the NPS simulation experiments & efficient design 
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(SEED) laboratory. All four were connected in similar fashion to the jCORE laptops via a 
Netgear switch and cables. They also had sufficient computational power (Core i5 and 
above) to operate LITMUS warfighter-plugin. None of the eight laptops ever glitched or 
failed running their respective programs due to lacking computational power. 
There were two scenarios, one in the South China Sea (SCS), and the other in 
vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz (SOH). There was a background political-military story 
that led to potential conflict. A scene setter was developed to give to blue and red force 
players a commander’s intent, rules of engagement (ROE), order of battle (OOB), and win/
lose criteria. This scenario was designed to push blue forces into conflict since red forces 
quickly hit the briefed trip wire. In order for blue to win, they have to aggressively develop 
and implement a plan to use air assets to discern the location and attack those red forces 
breaking through the exclusion zone. Losing the aircraft carrier in either scenario meant 
blue forces lost and the session was terminated immediately. Appendix C covers the details. 
The SOH scenario was composed in similar format with a background political-
military situation, and scene setters laying out goals to accomplish with the given assets. 
This scenario was designed to address how to counter small boat attack and exercise 
restraint. Blue forces are split on each side of the SOH to complicate the theatre geometry, 
communications, and decision making. Day-one was intended to have kinetic effects only 
after red forces initiate offensive action. Day-two is meant to test the players ability to 
realize that red forces displayed hostile intent but did not meet criteria for ROE. Appendix 
C covers the details. 
2. Phase I 
a. Procedures 
Phase I consisted of a pilot test where SMEs validated the tests, scenarios, and 
surveys. It was conducted from 14–15 January 2019. Members of both the jCORE and 
LITMUS development teams assisted with the pilot test. The participants played each 
scenario in both serious games, thus playing a total of four times. We followed the 
procedures according to the script during the actual experiment, and realized some 
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improvements for Phase II. Those lessons were implemented into the final version of the 
experiment for Phase II. 
Phase I began with participants completing the permission forms and a 
demographic survey. The participants were broken into two groups to play LITMUS and 
jCORE simultaneously. Prior to playing each game, participants received a one-hour 
tutorial. While playing, the subjects battled each other in the scenarios: one or two subjects 
commanded the blue forces, while another commanded red forces (opposition). When there 
were multiple participants playing on the same team, we allowed them to decide how to 
split control of their units. After two scenarios using the same game on the first day, the 
next day they conducted the same two scenarios using the other game. The scenarios were 
expected to take 1.5 hours, but only took one. Both game designers incorporated our 
feedback and other SMEs to improve the training value to the target audience. 
b. Participants 
Participants in Phase I were staff members of the assessment staff on the west coast. 
It evaluates and provides training to the staffs of carrier strike groups, amphibious groups, 
and expeditionary strike groups homeported in the Pacific theater. They are the 
acknowledged SMEs, both for strike group staff operations and training. 
Five players provided inputs as SMEs. Four were lieutenant commanders 
(LCDRs)/O-4 and one fire control chief (FCC)/E-7. Each individual had completed many 
deployments before reporting to the assessment staff, and most had evaluated other staffs 
undergoing work-ups as a member of the assessment staff.  
They were randomly divided up to play jCORE and LITMUS. A low sample of 
volunteers due to external operational commitments prevented being able to play in a 
hierarchical fashion – some players report to a player acting as the overall officer in charge. 
The pilot study had players on both sides instead of playing together as the blue forces. 
The researchers collected data on their comfort levels with video games, of which few had 
much experience or comfort. Those that scored their overall comfort higher with video 
games were quicker to understand the benefits of hot keys offered in jCORE.  
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3. Phase II 
a. Procedures 
The experiment was conducted on 27–28 March 2019. The methodology was 
similar to the pilot study with a few notable changes. All participants played as blue forces 
and the research associate played as red forces. The pretest was given prior to the tutorial 
session and post-test one was administered upon completion of the second session on day-
two. Post-test two was sent approximately one month later. An updated survey was given 
to glean additional demographic information. Many of the SG suggestions were 
incorporated pro bono, making the gaming experience better for the players. 
b. Participants 
Phase II worked with a west-coast CCSG, a deployable strike group staff, at a 
TTGP building in Point Loma THIRD FLEET complex. Six participants spanned ranks 
from chief warrant officer (CWO) 2 to commander (CDR). The CCSG committed six 
participants to enable manning of three roles in the experiment for blue forces: the admiral 
(Bravo), strike commander (Papa), and Sea Combat Commander (Zulu). All participants 
had a wide variety of gaming experience and years of Navy service. They also filled out 
surveys after each of the four gaming sessions like Phase I participants, but here they 
completed the three tests from which Chapter IV derives its data.  
4. Phase III 
a. Procedures 
The control-group consisted of many different staff officers using the current 
standard of traditional learning. TTGL delivered one week of traditional training, and 
allowed participants enrolled in JMTC to participate. JMTC academics were conducted in 
March 2019. All volunteers completed the pretest before academics commenced, and post-
test one upon completion of the training. Approximately a month later, post-test two was 
given. No surveys were provided since nobody played an SG. However, some basic 
military demographic data was collected. 
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b. Participants 
Phase III was the control group of 18 test subjects. These volunteers were attending 
JMTC at TTGL and volunteered to help out with the experiment as the control group. Test 
subjects spanned in rank from CWO2 to CAPT and years of service from 8 to 23 years. 
They did not take surveys, or provide gaming experience. Most of the volunteers completed 
all three tests.  
5. Data Collection 
We conducted surveys after each gaming session to record their opinions and 
experience. The survey’s graded metrics were doctrine, operational planning, decision 
making, organizational construct, and feedback. Those metrics are broken down into 
subcategories and were all equally weighted. Players scored them from one to five. Four 
surveys from each participant were taken from both Phases I and II.  
The three tests were used to answer the whether the hypothesis was accepted or 
rejected. Each test was composed of 30 questions and each volunteer was given a maximum 
of 30 minutes to complete. The tests were interchangeable to ensure equality and could be 
completed in any order. Half the questions came from TTGL and the other half I created 
with assistance from SMEs. Questions were multiple choice, fill in the blank, and true/
false. Though some of the questions were similar, all 90 questions were unique. One 
question from the pretest and post-test 1 were thrown out. In one instance, the true/false 
question was too vague and could be interpreted so each answer was correct. The other 
removed question was a fill-in-the-blank. It was too complex and nobody got it entirely 
correct. Post-test 2 removed the question that received the most wrong answers to stay 
consistent with the other tests. The experimentation and control group received the same 
three tests, but in different order to avoid confounding the data.  
C. LIMITATIONS 
1. Gaming Software 
Both serious games were not commercial products and thus had not undergone the 
traditional processes to produce to a wider audience. They both have alternate uses and for 
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this experiment were considered beta versions. During Phase I, LITMUS crashed and had 
to be restarted multiple times. However, the surveys did not suggest a pronounced negative 
impact relative to jCORE. Phase II incorporated much of the suggestions from Phase I, but 
there was not time or budget to transition either SG from a more tactical gaming feel to the 
OLW desired. 
2. Participants  
Phase I had one individual have to leave after the first day, leaving only four for 
the second day. Such a small ‘n’ (sample size) did not compromise the pilot phase since no 
test scores were taken.  
Phase II also had a small n due to a number of unexpected events pulling potential 
players away. Though nothing could be done to increase the numbers, the volunteers 
present were engaged with the experiment for the two days. The numbers did not decline 
enough to negatively impact the study. 
It is expected that some participants would not complete post-test 2 since they 
become unavailable one month later. As stated in the IRB, everything about the experiment 
is voluntary. 
3. Research Associates 
Research associates were used for Phase II. They did not know the games prior to 
the pilot phase or experiment. Hours of game testing helped improve their proficiency 
enough to play the red forces. Due to lower than expected number of participants for Phase 
II, one associate played on blue forces team. 
 
31 
IV. RESULTS 
There were two types of data collected—subjective data from surveys, and 
objective data from tests. The survey data was inputted into Microsoft Excel. The test data 
used the open source programming language for computing statistics called R studio was 
used. Our statistical analysis considers smaller sample sizes to compensate for not meeting 
the central limit theorem tenets.  
A. SUBJECTIVE DATA 
The Likert survey reflects what the users felt from each gaming session. A total of 
twenty surveys were taken between Phases I and II. Generic demographic data included 
SG played, gaming experience, confidence in current billet, rank, years of service, or an 
overall score.  
The volunteers were asked four questions, as seen in Appendix D.  Figure 5 displays 
the player output. Decimals are there if the participant filled out the demographics section 
of the survey more than once and changed an answer. The noticeable difference in score 
was in comfort with gaming. Despite the full spectrum of scoring from one to five, most 
players noted that it was entertaining.    
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Figure 5. Experiment group demographics answers to survey 
Figure 6 shows the participants scores for the first scenario played, and Figure 7 is 
an overall scorecard. Neither of the serious games graded out above a four out of a possible 
five in any of the categories. Both games were similar overall, and not as high as we 
initially expected since neither game was a specifically designed SG for staff 
watchstanders. Feedback consistently graded out much higher than the other metrics, due 
in part to the players better understanding the survey feedback questions.  
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Figure 6. Phase II survey displaying results from the SCS scenario 
Figure 7. Phase II survey comparing overall serious games played 
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B. ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
‘Rstudio’ imported data from Excel as a CSV file. Initial analysis of the data sets 
was running the repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) test. The next runs were 
the Cox-Stuart trend analysis (RDocumentation, n.d.-a), and finished with the sign test 
(RDocumentation, n.d.-c). Table 1 is a box and whisker chart visually displaying the test 
score results from the experiment group. The pretest, post-test 1, and post-test 2 are out of 
29 possible correct. ID #2 and #6 did not complete post-test 2, and scores were included as 
the mean of the other four.   
Table 1. Phase II test results 
Table 2 is the basic descriptive statistics. Minimum and maximum represents the 
lowest and highest scored test, respectively. Median is the middle score and mean is the 
sum of all scores divided by the number of participants. The first and third quartiles are 
middle number between the minimum and maximum, respectively. The standard deviation 
shows variation from the means. With a small sample size, the post-test 1 minimum brings 
down the mean and increases the standard deviation to over double the pretest standard 
deviation.  
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Table 2. Phase II summary of descriptive data  
Pretest Post-test 1 Post-test 2 
Minimum:  20.0 Min.: 17.0 Min.  19.0 
1st Quartile:  22.5 1st Qu.: 18.25 1st Qu.: 21.12 
Median: 23 Median:  20.0 Median: 21.5 
Mean:  22.5 Mean:  22.0 Mean: 21.5 
3rd Quartile. : 23.0 3rd Qu.: 20.75 3rd Qu:  21.88 
Maximum:  24.0 Maximum. : 25.0 Max.: 24.0 
Standard Dev.:  1.378  S.D.:  2.828 S.D.:  1.612  
 
There are different types of ANOVA tests. The main point for using the ANOVA 
test is to compare differences between means by comparing variation between the groups 
relative to a variation within each group. ANOVA is a method to test differences between 
multiple means. Inferences are made about the means through analyzing the variances. To 
conduct the ANOVA test, the assumptions are that the data set is a random sample, the 
measurements for the response in the data is distributed according to a normal distribution, 
each observation in the sample are independent, and the measurement is quantitative data. 
A large difference between the means of each group when compared to the variation within 
the group suggests a rejection of the null hypothesis. 
The first test run was the repeated-measures ANOVA. Since the tests were not 
independent and there is only one factor, the repeated-measures ANOVA (also called 
within-subjects ANOVA) was deemed the best option. Subjects had the same comparison 
with different conditions since this experiment had three different tests. Another reason 
repeated-measures ANOVA was chosen was because it tends to have more power than the 
more commonly employed ANOVA version. For the repeated-measures ANOVA, and all 
other Rstudio coding, see Appendix A. 
The null hypothesis is listed below, while the alternative hypothesis is any condition 
where one of the equalities does not hold up. HO is the null hypothesis, EPRE represents the 
experimental pretest, EPOST1 post-test 1, and EPOST2 is the post-test 2. HA represents the 
alternative hypothesis. The significance level used was for all tests was set at α = 0.05, and 
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focus on “right sided.” The rationale was that we were looking to see whether SG post-test 
1 would improve upon the pretest. 
H0: EPre = Epost1 = EPost2  
HA: one of the equalities is different from H0 
Df is the degrees of freedom. The key metric from Table 3 is the Pr(>F), which is 
the ‘p-value’, or probability of rejecting the null hypothesis. We related 0.18 to 0.05 and 
can see there is no significant difference statistically between the experimental group’s 
three test scores.  
Table 3. Experimental group repeated measure ANOVA output 
 Df 
Sum 
Sq 
Mean 
Sq 
F 
value Pr(>F) 
D 2 18.78 9.389 2.11 0.172 
Residuals 10 44.56 4.456   
 
The next test run was the Cox-Stuart test. It compared each test against the other 
check for trends: increasing, decreasing or no trend observed. This test is valuable since it 
does not rely on independent data. Figure 8 shows the output from Rstudio for the test.  
HO: There is no trend. 
HA: There is a trend. 
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Figure 8. Cox-Stuart output comparing all three experimental group 
tests 
The last line provides the important details of the output. An increasing trend means 
that results from the former to the latter increased. The p-values are all above 0.05, meaning 
HO is accepted. Therefore, we cannot make any indication concerning retention of 
knowledge. 
The final statistical test that was run is called the sign test for a two-sample paired 
data set. This checks for symmetry between the test scores. The sign test is non-parametric, 
so it does not have to fall into a particular distribution. The null hypothesis is the difference 
between medians equal to zero, and the alternative hypothesis is that it is not. 
The key take-aways for the sign test can be found in Figure 9. The p-value above 
0.05 signifies that the null hypothesis was accepted with the true mean difference not equal 
to zero, which was similar to Cox-Stuart trend analysis. The other sign test comparison 
outputs are in Appendix B.  
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Figure 9. Sign test comparing the experiment group pretest to post-
test 1 from Rstudio 
C. ANALYSIS OF CONTROL GROUP DATA 
The control group was larger than the experimental group due to the fact that it had 
JMTC to draw upon for volunteers. Table 4 is a box and whisker chart visually displaying 
the test score results from the control group. Some of them did not have time to take post-
test 2 one month after finishing JMTC, where they completed the pretest and post-test 1. 
ID #7, #8, #10 and #11 did not complete post-test 2, and scores were included as the mean 
of the other fourteen.   
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Table 4. Phase III control group test results  
 
 
The values in Table 5 display the descriptive statistics associated with the control 
group. The scores are surprising close across the board.  
Table 5. Phase III summary of descriptive data  
Pretest Post-test 1 Post-test 2 
Minimum:  19.0 Min.: 17.0 Min.  17.5 
1st Quartile:   21.0  1st Qu.: 21.0 1st Qu.: 20.62 
Median: 23.0 Median:  22.5 Median: 21.75 
Mean:  22.94 Mean:  22.5 Mean: 21.75 
3rd Quartile: 25.0 3rd Qu.: 24.0 3rd Qu:  23.5 
Maximum:  27.0 Max.: 27.0 Max.: 26.0 
Standard Deviation:  2.338  S.D.:  2.684 S.D.: 2.325  
 
The control group analysis follows the same statistical testing as the experimental 
group: repeated-measure ANOVA, Cox-Stuart test, and the sign test. The null and 
alternative hypothesis are similar to the experimental group, except. Here, CPRE, CPOST1 
and CPOST2 represent the pretest, post-test 1, and post-test 2 respectively. The 
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significance level used for all control group tests was set at α = 0.05. Table 6 displays the 
repeated ANOVA output from Rstudio.  
H0: CPre = Cpost1 = CPost2  
HA: one of the equalities is different from H0 
Table 6. Control group repeated measure ANOVA output 
 
 
The next test run was the Cox-Stuart test, checking the control group for trends. 
Figure 10 shows the output from Rstudio for the test. The Cox-Stuart test ‘p-value’ was 
greater than α. None of the p-values were notable for any of the three combinations.  This 
means we accepted the null hypothesis for the control group that there is no significant 
difference in test scores trending. A higher sample size (n) does not improve the p-value.  
 
Figure 10. Cox-Stuart output comparing all three control group tests 
The final control group test was the sign test for a two-sample paired data set. The 
key take-aways for the sign test is in Figure 11. The p-value is below 0.05, signifying that 
the null hypothesis is rejected with the true mean difference above zero. This means we 
can state that the scores are significantly different after a month (post-test 2) from first 
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taking a test (pretest).  The comparison of the post-tests again revealed a high p-value 
similar to Cox-Stuart trend analysis. The null hypothesis was retained and accepted that 
there was no difference between the post tests. This cannot supply proof that there is or is 
not an increase in knowledge or about retention. 
 
Figure 11. Sign test comparing the control group pretest to post-test 2 
from Rstudio 
D. COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL GROUP DATA 
In order to compare two independent variables each with three dependent variables 
(tests), a different statistical test is required. The only one that is non-parametric, capable 
of handling smaller samples, and compare different sized groups is the mixed design 
ANOVA (RDocumentation, n.d.-b) Mauchly’s test for sphericity and sphericity correction 
test are additional, related tests checking within-subject conditions are equal. 
The mixed-design ANOVA test can compare the means with repeated measures as 
well as independent measurements, and provide a single output, which is shown in Table 7. 
To understand the figure, the left column represents the groups and their interaction. DFn 
and DFd are degrees of freedom for the independent and dependent variable, respectively. 
GGe is the Greenhouse-Geiser effect, which evaluates within-subjects test output 
continuously. p [GG] is the p-value after the GGe is incorporated. HFe is Huynh-Feldt 
epsilon. p [HF] is the p-value after applying the HFe correction.  
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Table 7. Data comparison of experimental and control group 
 
 
Table 7 has three different p-values under the prescribed α. Starting with the mixed-
design ANOVA, unfortunately the interaction’s low p-value does not provide tangible 
evidence about the experimental or control groups test scores. The sphericity corrections 
also are below α. Again, the interaction doesn’t give information that provides a 
meaningful proof to accept or reject the hypothesis. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. DISCUSSION 
Navy staff officers rely heavily on their experiences from their first sea tours. 
Though the same framework is used to prepare for deployment (OFRP) for staffs and ships 
or squadrons, the training curricula are vastly different. Staff officers get a quick exposure, 
some FST training, and live underway time. However, there may be opportunities to 
augment their busy schedule with additional training aids. The background research 
provided answers to the first three research questions while the experiment compared 
serious games to traditional classroom training from the fourth research question.  
The first question asked if the training standard was met with current options.  It is 
as the curriculum is written, however each option after the exposure course(s) has no 
individual review or training option; everything is a large-scale event like FST or getting a 
CSG underway. This points to a need for individuals to have a lower-fidelity option like a 
part task trainer.   
Serious games must be specifically designed with the intention of meeting 
watchstander requirements and CSG METs in order to properly and effectively train the 
staff officer. Factors such as design flow, PE, UX, and data collection must be considered 
with purposing a SG for military training.   
Serious games cannot replace the training that is being conducted, and never should 
alone.  There will continue to be a need to train in the live and virtual environments. There 
does appear to be room for a part-task trainer that is easily accessible and can be completed 
in a short time span. Precedent was set years ago that a need exists for a lower-fidelity 
training system, but incorporating it into the staff officer training curriculum is more of a 
cultural impediment than technical.   
The experiment hypothesized that classroom training and serious games would 
yield the different results for test improvement and retention. There were six participants 
in the experimental group that played two different serious games over two days compared 
to 18 volunteers in the control group taking JMTC for a week of classroom lecture. Three 
 
44 
tests were administered to both groups while the experiment group also completed surveys 
after each gaming session. The three tests provided the objective data with the surveys 
enabling subjective data to be gathered. Before training began, a 30-question pretest was 
given followed by a post-test after training was completed. Post-test 2 was done about one 
month after completion of training.  
The statistical analysis was conducted on the experimental group, the control group, 
and a comparison of independent groups. The statistics tests coded in Rstudio were the 
repeated measures ANOVA, the Cox-Stuart trend analysis, the Sign test, and mixed-design 
ANOVA test. Though the process was followed properly, only one statistically significant 
difference in the tests were found that showed a positive trend between the pretest and post-
test 2 in the control group.  All others were did not meet the threshold of p-value less than 
or equal to 0.05.  
The surveys did yield some validating comments about serious games. SG use was 
positive across ease of use, engaging, and considered more enjoyable than classroom 
training. The last consensus was that there was a deployable staff training gap. SG were 
seen as a possible low-fidelity solution to train on-demand for individual watchstanders or 
small groups.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The experiment was successful in providing a platform where staff officers would 
like to see further investigation and experiments. Though this was a low budget, limited 
experiment with minimal statistically significant results, there were some worthy insights 
to share. 
• Digital data collection. Some in-situ data collection is already present, 
such as jCORE’s after action review, but much more could be 
programmed and incorporated to coincide with pre-established goals. 
Knowing the metrics and end-state training objectives could tie into what 
data to collect from the program. 
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• Refined gaming experience. The players who were more proficient gamers 
learned much quicker about hot to defeat the enemy and did not need to 
use Navy doctrine or unit TTPs. Instead of open-ended red versus blue 
assets, a focus should be on building a lesson from a publication like 
NTTP 3–60.2 Maritime Dynamic Targeting. 
• Single player training. If a single player version was pursued, it would 
need to get away from a gaming experience like Starcraft 2 when the best 
players click over 150 times per minute. The gaming session should be 
more scenario-based with three to four timed-choices, and associated 
consequences from those decisions with feedback. 
• Multi-player training. This version would significantly contrast single 
player training. This would focus on soft skills like decision making, 
communications, and understanding the roles of each player within the 
strike group. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
The following bullets suggest where dedicated efforts could positively impact Navy 
training. The above recommendations could be incorporated here, but these are meant to 
be stand-alone spring boards into separate studies. 
• Training effectiveness evaluation. A TEE consists of much more dedicated 
research than one student, some funding, and a couple research associates 
setting up some gaming sessions. This would investigate deeper into each 
area that was touched upon here in this experiment. A fully funded study 
may find more insightful, statistically significant results. 
• Closed-loop simulation. Wargaming and training are worthy research 
topics. Another avenue worth exploring with the operations analysis 
department would be to employ LITMUS or another closed-loop 
simulation to see where bottlenecks in information and decision flow may 
occur on a staff or effects chain. Inserting higher or lower proficient 
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watchstanders may prove out where to best put time to improve their 
skills.  
• Standardization. A staff officer’s job has tasks, conditions and standards 
just like most any other job in the Navy. A comprehensive examination of 
the training curriculum and process is due. Investigation could confirm the 
training curriculum requires more than exposure courses, some FST 
events, and a few weeks of live training.  
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APPENDIX A.  CODING FROM R-STUDIO 
The following tests with the exception of mixed-design ANOVA were run multiple 
times. The first lines pull the test scores associated with the subjects’ ID. The next lines set 
up each part of the necessary data to incorporate into the ‘R’ coding requirements. The ‘R’ 
code was pulled directly from Rstudio. 
###########  DATA   ################ 
ExpPre<-c(23,23,24,20,23,22) # experimental group pretest 
ExpPost1<-c(18,21,25,20,19,17) # experimental group post-test 1 
ExpPost2<-c(19,21.5,22,21,24,21.5)   #experimental group post-test 2  
PRE <-c(24,22,21,22,25,27,24,26,20,24,20,25,19,21,25,21,22,25) # control pretest 
POST1 <- c(27,24,24,25,24,25,23,27,20,23,19,21,17,22,21,21,20,22) # control post-test 1 
POST2 <- c(19,22,21,20.5,24,24.5,21.75,21.75,17.5,21.75,21.75,24,18,20,21,26,25,22)  
 
##### DESCRIPTIVE STATS  ############## 
summary(ExpPre) 
summary(ExpPost1) 
summary(ExpPost2) 
summary(PRE) 
summary(POST1) 
summary(POST2) 
sd(ExpPre) 
sd(ExpPost1) 
sd(ExpPost2) 
sd(PRE) 
sd(POST1) 
sd(POST2) 
 
##### repeated measure ANOVA   ############## 
## exp group## 
Activation <- c(D[,2],D[,3],D[,4]) 
Subject<-factor(rep(D[,1],3))  
D<-factor(rep(c("Pretest","PostA","PostB"),rep(6,3)))  
aovD<-aov(Activation~D+Error(Subject))  
summary(aovD) 
 
path<-'/Users/danielcain/TestScoresExpcsv.csv' 
data<-read.csv(path) 
data 
D<-read.csv(path) 
Activation <- c(D[,2],D[,3],D[,4])    
Activation 
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length(Activation) 
Subject<-factor(rep(D[,1],3))  
Subject                           # 8-17 works 
Test<-factor(rep(c("T1","T2","T3"),rep(6,3)))     
aovD<-aov(Activation~Test+Error(Subject))        
summary(aovD)                                    # works 
 
### control group ## 
path<-'/Users/danielcain/TestScoresCONTROL.csv' 
data1<-read.csv(path) 
data1 
D.1<-read.csv(path) 
Activation.1 <- c(D.1[,2],D.1[,3],D.1[,4]) 
Activation.1 
length(Activation) 
Subject<-factor(rep(D.1[,1],3)) 
Subject 
Test<-factor(rep(c("T1","T2","T3"),rep(18,3))) 
aovD<-aov(Activation.1~Test+Error(Subject)) 
summary(aovD) 
 
#######  COX STUART ###### 
 
library(randtests) 
cox.stuart.test(c(ExpPre,ExpPost1), "right.sided") 
cox.stuart.test(c(ExpPre,ExpPost2), "right.sided") 
cox.stuart.test(c(ExpPost1, ExpPost2), "right.sided") 
cox.stuart.test(c(PRE,POST1), "right.sided") 
cox.stuart.test(c(POST1, POST2), "right.sided") 
cox.stuart.test(c(PRE,POST2), "right.sided") 
 
##########  SIGN TEST   ########## 
 
library(BSDA) 
SIGN.test(ExpPre,ExpPost1, 
          alternative = "two.sided", 
          conf.level = 0.95) 
SIGN.test(ExpPre,ExpPost2, 
          alternative = "two.sided", 
          conf.level = 0.95) 
SIGN.test(ExpPost1,ExpPost2, 
          alternative = "two.sided", 
          conf.level = 0.95) 
PRE 
POST1 
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POST2 
SIGN.test(PRE,POST1, 
          alternative = "two.sided", 
          conf.level = 0.95) 
SIGN.test(PRE,POST2, 
          alternative = "two.sided", 
          conf.level = 0.95) 
SIGN.test(POST1,POST2, 
          alternative = "two.sided", 
          conf.level = 0.95) 
 
######  mixed design ANOVA   ######## 
library(ez) 
TestData<-read.table("TestScoresRY2.csv", header = TRUE,sep=",") 
Testdata  ## upload data set 
summary(TestData)       ## Print summary  
rt_anova = ezANOVA(data=TestData, dv=Data, wid = ID, within = Label, between = 
Experiment) 
print(rt_anova) 
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APPENDIX B.  OUTPUT FROM R-STUDIO 
Here are the outputs not listed in the thesis. The data here is not statistically 
significant but provided for context and disclosure.   
 
Figure 12. Experimental group sign test results 
 
Figure 13. Control group sign test results 
 
52 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
53 
APPENDIX C.  SCENARIOS 
A. SOUTH CHINA SEA SCENARIO 
1. Political-Military Background 
In 2020, RED is the world’s largest economy. However, with its newfound status, 
GDP has slowed to under 1% annually and recession is looming. The gap in living 
standards between poor, inland farmers and the more urban coastal dwellers has grown, 
leading to civil unrest. Many civilian analysts assume that RED’s bellicose rhetoric 
regarding its territorial claims is an attempt to distract the population from internal 
difficulties, and strengthen civil unity under the Communist Party banner. 
With its burgeoning middle class, RED demands for oil and natural gas are ever 
increasing.  Since 2017, RED has continued to fortify its claims in the Spratly Island chain, 
expanding land reclamation projects and now has its sights on the southern tip of the South 
China Sea with the island of Natuna Besar, a small island chain belonging to GREEN. 
Annexing this tiny island chain would give RED complete control of the busiest sea lanes 
in the world. 
 
Figure 14. Location of Natuna Besar 
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BLUE has continued freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) through RED’s 
excessive maritime claims, yet this has had no effect on RED military build-up or claims.  
Further, RED warships have become more aggressive in their enforcement activities, and 
regularly harass fishing vessels of other nations, including territorial waters of Natuna 
Besar.   
GREEN is an archipelagic nation on the southern edge of the South China Sea. 
Internal instability in the main islands of GREEN has simmered, preoccupying the 
GREEN’s naval forces. It had no appreciable military ties with BLUE.  Sensing a potential 
threat from RED, BLUE has sought to reassure regional stakeholders in the South China 
Sea, especially GREEN.  Just in the last month, BLUE and GREEN have signed a mutual 
protection pact to include Natuna Besar.  RED state-controlled media declared recent the 
recent arms sales dialogue from BLUE to GREEN as an “unfair effort” to restrain RED. 
RED citizens are clamoring social media, calling for a “humbling” of BLUE forces in the 
region.  Vietnam has provided a logistics and port facilities to RED vessels begrudgingly 
to avoid greater conflict. 
Since 2016, the BLUE Navy has adapted its fleet design to meet future challenges. 
Through a combination of doctrinal and materiel development, BLUE has transitioned 
from a “platform-centric” to a “fleet-centric” force. Therefore, air, surface, and subsurface 
kill chains are highly resilient, consisting of networked ships, aircraft, weapons, and 
unmanned systems. 
2. Disputed Waters 
In January 2020, GREEN fishermen, tired of harassment by RED combat vessels 
and no help from GREEN government, staged a series of protests. Additionally, for the last 
two weeks, RED warships harassed white shipping.  Some of the ships were BLUE allied-
flagged motor vessels in international water.  
In March of 2020, a GREEN patrol craft did not return from its patrol.  GREEN 
fisherman reported seeing a RED warship fire upon and sink it. Official RED accounts of 
the incident state that a DDG in the area saw the PC sinking and attempted to render aid, 
but nobody survived. Some in the GREEN government claim that the RED civilians have 
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inquired about expanding Natuna airport. RED has hinted at putting ground forces on 
Natuna Besar in order to ensure “peaceful air and maritime operations” are abided by 
according to international law.  
3. Political Situation
RED political will to start an actual conflict is considered imminent. RED may 
perceive the upcoming BLUE FONOPS and possible GREEN military acquisitions as a 
potential threat, giving them a real incentive to occupy before the island is fortified. BLUE 
is not offered safe harbor in its territorial waters, due to historically cautious relationship. 
Further, it is an election year for BLUE’s President, and failure to show resolve during this 
quickly escalating foreign policy crisis may cost reelection. 
4. Military Activity
BLUE satellite imagery shows a RED Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Brigade 
was already embarking on amphibious ships for a “previously planned” exercise. RED’s 
South Sea Fleet has started to sortie ships and possibly submarines, and that they have 
increased maritime patrols over the South China Sea.  
Figure 15. Intelligence summary—RED and BLUE OOB IVO Natuna 
Besar 24 hours old 
 
56 
BLUE is determined to support GREEN, deploying forces to respond to RED 
threats and prevent a land grab at all costs. Commander Carrier Strike Group (CSG) NINE 
is in the Sea of Japan conducting exercises and is scheduled to arrive within two days. The 
surge-ready CSG in San Diego is getting underway, but cannot arrive for another two 
weeks. Therefore, Commander, US Seventh Fleet (C7F) must rely on forces already in the 
vicinity of the South China Sea. Time is on RED’s side, and BLUE must respond with 
forces on hand until reinforcements can arrive.   
BLUE intel suggests all RED submarine threats have been accounted for via 
satellite imagery over the last four weeks.  Additionally, a BLUE fast-attack submarine is 
three days out from assisting.  BLUE forces have been authorized to engage should the 
RED amphibious force get within 50NM of Natuna Besar.   
B. SOUTH CHINA SEA BLUE SCENE SETTER 
1. Purpose 
LITMUS and jCORE – South China Sea explore Fleet Design in naval warfare at 
the operational level. Like any wargame, they are designed to capture the human elements 
of warfare. Therefore, players will be required to make decisions in the face of uncertainty. 
2. Game Design 
LITMUS and jCORE are closed wargames, meaning that opposing teams will play 
on opposite sides of room. Each team will have knowledge of: 
1. Events that led to conflict (scenario) 
2. Objectives (mission goals), provided by leadership and higher headquarters 
3. Own force composition and capabilities 
4. Capabilities of possible enemy platforms 
Each team will have incomplete knowledge of: 
1. The true enemy objective 
2. The enemy force composition 
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Teams will have to make decisions based on: 
1. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plans they develop 
2. Technical and intelligence injects 
Adjudication will rest with the student researcher, based on wargaming experience, 
analysis and knowledge of the combat modeling tools.  
Commander’s intent  
Prevent the landing of any one of the three RED amphibious ships on Natuna Besar.   
- If fired upon, exercise self-defense with proportionality. 
- Enforce the 50NM exclusion zone (EZ) surrounding Natuna Besar.  
Maneuver to anticipate any Red force threat without initiating effects if they have not 
entered the EZ. 
- Establish continuous search of EZ.  All assets are to bear the responsibility 
of, and share the duties of search. 
- Any interaction outside of EZ shall be professional, and IAW UNCLOS. 
- Maintain open SLOC from Japan to Australia for white shipping. 
- Do not seek refuge in country Green’s TTW for any reason.   
- All asset Link-capable shall immediately share information up the 
appropriate CoC.  Should there be a Link or GPS-denied environment, follow appropriate 
guidance. 
Posture: Rd / Ti.   
Mission Goals 
Each force has is a set of desired outcomes from game play.  Below are the details 
in order to achieve a “win” or “loss”.  Should one side not definitively achieve the requisite 
number of conditions, then it will each win condition is worth one point.  The side with the 
most points wins, while a tie is a “détente”. 
BLUE Forces Goals 
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In order to win, blue must achieve three of the following while adhering to other 
specifics: 
• Achieve a kill ratio equal of 3:1 for all assets 
• Prevent RED any amphibious landing on Natuna Besar 
• Kill 90% of RED air assets found 
• Sink 70% of RED surface assets found 
BLUE loses if any of the following conditions exist by the end of game play: 
• BLUE CVN is sunk 
• An entire SAG / CSG is not capable of conducting offensive operations at 
the end of game play 
• BLUE units seek shelter from GREEN (goes inside territorial waters to 
avoid conflict, excluding Natuna Besar) 
• BLUE player chooses wrong defensive capability vs threat over 30% of 
time 
C. STRAIT OF HORMUZ SCENARIO 
1. Political-Military Background 
In 2020, RED is the largest and most powerful country in the region. Despite its 
status as the dominant regional leader, GDP has declined by 3% annually due to an inability 
to get their oil to the world market. The decline in living standards has grown, leading to 
civil unrest. Many civilian analysts assume that RED’s bellicose rhetoric regarding its 
territorial claims is an attempt to distract the population from internal difficulties, and 
strengthen civil unity under the elected and appointed institutions of government. 
With its dwindling budgets, RED demands for oil and natural gas exports are ever 
increasing.  Since 2017, RED has continued to fortify its regional authority to include lands 
west and north of the gulf, as well as threaten white shipping into and out of the straits of 
Hormuz (SOH). The bottleneck is fortified with strike and reconnaissance aircraft, fast 
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attack craft (FAC), fast inshore attack craft (FIAC), land-based anti-ship cruise missiles 
(ASCM) and coastal integrated air defense systems (IADS). 
BLUE has continued freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) through RED’s 
excessive maritime claims, yet this has had no effect on RED military build-up or claims. 
Further, RED Islamic Revolutionary Corps vessels have become more aggressive in their 
harassment activities of shipping vessels of other nations, including GREEN. 
GREEN is a small nation on the northwestern edge of the Arabian Gulf. Though 
rich in oil, GREEN does not have the military capabilities to counter Red. It has strong 
military and diplomatic ties with BLUE.  Sensing a potential threat from RED, BLUE has 
sought to reassure regional partners, especially GREEN.  RED state-controlled media 
declared the recent arms sales from BLUE to GREEN and other nations in the region as an 
“unfair effort” to contain RED’s ambitions to dominate. RED citizens are clamoring social 
media, calling for a “humbling” of BLUE forces in the region. 
Since 2017, the BLUE Navy has adapted its fleet design to meet future challenges. 
Through a combination of doctrinal and materiel development, BLUE has transitioned 
from a “platform-centric” to a “fleet-centric” force. Therefore, air and surface kill chains 
are highly resilient, consisting of networked ships, aircraft, weapons, and unmanned 
systems. 
2. Closing the Straits of Hormuz 
In January 2020, GREEN’s merchant marine was denied passage by RED IRC 
ships, as specified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
For two weeks, RED denied others from entering the gulf as well.   
3. Political Situation 
RED political will to start an actual conflict imminently is considered high. RED 
may perceive the upcoming BLUE basing and GREEN military acquisitions as a potential 
threat, giving them a real incentive to keep the strait closed to punish other regional BLUE 
allies from selling and shipping oil.  BLUE is an ally of GREEN, and treaty-bound to 
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defend it. Further, it is an election year for BLUE’s president, and failure to show resolve 
during this quickly escalating foreign policy crisis may cost him reelection. 
4. Military Activity 
BLUE satellite imagery shows a RED combined IRC and conventional navy force 
used “previously planned” exercise to push forward with closing the strait.  All RED Navy 
forces near Bandar Abbas are fully manned with its highest readiness and deployment 
levels not seen in years. RED’s naval regions have started to sortie ships and submarines, 
and that they have increased maritime patrols on both sides of the strait. RED has also 
started mobilizing its SAM assets, transferring anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) from 
hardened storage facilities to working magazines.  Air assets are conducting ISR, while 
tactical aircraft are flying sorties to increase proficiency.   
 
Figure 16. Intelligence summary 
BLUE is determined to support GREEN, and keeping the straits open. They have 
forces already in the gulf, but also deployed forces to respond to RED threats and deter 
hostile action. Commander Carrier Strike Group (CSG) ONE is in the Arabian Sea 
conducting exercises and is scheduled to arrive at SOH within a day. A surge-ready CSG 
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in the Baltic Sea is capable, but cannot arrive on station for another week. Therefore, 
Commander, US Fifth Fleet (C5F) must rely on forces already in the vicinity. With the 
strait already closed, BLUE must respond with forces on hand until 
D. STRAIT OF HORMUZ BLUE SCENE SETTER 
1. Purpose 
LITMUS and jCORE – Strait of Hormuz explore Fleet Design in naval warfare at 
the operational level. Like any wargame, they are designed to capture the human elements 
of warfare. Therefore, players will be required to make decisions in the face of uncertainty. 
2. Game Design 
LITMUS and jCORE are closed wargames, meaning that opposing teams will play 
on opposite sides of room. Each team will have knowledge of: 
1. Events that led to conflict (scenario) 
2. Objectives (mission goals), provided by leadership and higher headquarters 
3. Own force composition and capabilities 
4. Capabilities of possible enemy platforms 
Each team will have incomplete knowledge of: 
1. The true enemy objective 
2. The enemy force composition 
Teams will have to make decisions based on: 
1. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plans they develop 
2. Technical and intelligence injects 
Adjudication will rest with the student researcher, based on wargaming experience, 
analysis and knowledge of the combat modeling tools.  
Blue Commander’s intent  
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Maintain a presence in the gulf.  Keep the SOH open to commercial traffic.  Stay 
out of neutral country’s TTW.  Attempt to minimize any acts which could be construed as 
hostile intent by country RED.   
- If fired upon, exercise self-defense with proportionality.  Trip wires such as 
FAC (or larger vessel) fire-control radar may be considered hostile intent. 
- Expect Red naval forces to probe defenses and TTP for FAC/FIAC.  Do not 
pursue or react unless an individual vessel maneuvers within 500 feet, or a group within ¼ 
NM. 
- Establish continuous search of vital area and of any Red naval forces 
underway.  All assets are to bear the responsibility of, and share the duties of search for 
time in Arabian Gulf. 
- Any interaction shall be professional, and IAW UNCLOS. 
- Maintain open SLOC from country Green to Gulf of Oman (GOO) for white 
shipping. 
- All asset Link-capable shall immediately share information up the 
appropriate CoC.  Should there be a Link or GPS-denied environment, follow appropriate 
guidance. 
Posture: Rd / Ti.   
Mission Goals 
Each force has is a set of desired outcomes from game play.  Below are the details 
in order to achieve a “win” or “loss”.  Should one side not definitively achieve the requisite 
number of conditions, then it will each win condition is worth one point.  The side with the 
most points wins, while a tie is a “détente”. 
BLUE Forces Goals 
A. In order to win, BLUE must achieve three of the following while adhering 
to other specifics: 
• Achieve a kill ratio equal of 5:1 for all assets 
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• Maintain a “presence” and ability to defend SOH for over 50% of game play 
• Achieve air superiority (8:1 ratio) 
• Neutralize military capability from Bandar Abbas 
• Do not commence hostilities, but adhere to inherent right to self-defense 
and pre-planned responses 
B. BLUE loses if any of the following conditions exist, ending game play: 
• Blue CVN is sunk 
• An entire SAG / CSG is not capable of conducting offensive operations at 
the end of game play 
• BLUE units seek shelter from GREEN or neutral country in gulf (goes 
inside territorial waters to avoid conflict) 
• BLUE player chooses wrong defense capability vs threat over 30% of time 
  
 
64 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
65 
APPENDIX D.  SCENARIOS 
The IRB-approved survey was created in excel. The survey was briefed to the 
experiment audience so that questions were not erroneous filled in since we learned in 
Phase I that there could be multiple ways of interpreting the questions. 
 
Figure 17. Experiment survey page 1 of 2 
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Figure 18. Experiment survey page 2 of 2  
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